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 Although distinctive and groundbreaking in many respects, Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary 
of the English Language (1755) is typical of eighteenth-century lexicons in its definition of 
“oral” as “delivered by mouth; not written” and “orally” as “by mouth; without writing.” Nathan 
Bailey, who compiled his Dictionarium Britannicum in 1730 and John Ash, whose New and 
Complete Dictionary of the English Language was published in 1775, draw the same attention to 
the physical production of sound by the body, and to the opposition of the oral to the literate arts: 
“delivered by the mouth or voice,” they assert, “not committed to writing.” The clarity and 
confidence of these definitions suggests that there was, from the early  part of the eighteenth 
century, an awareness of a conceptual difference between spoken and written language.1  Indeed, 
Nicholas Hudson (1996) has argued that extended and conscious differentiation of this kind 
arises for the first time in this period, as the work of the numerous lexicographers, grammarians, 
and conjectural historians who began to investigate the origins of languages, alphabetic script, 
and the development of modern civilizations drew new attention to the oral dimension of 
language. Prior to this, although it was acknowledged that the oral and literate differed as modes 
of transmission, accounts of linguistic structure and development were constructed primarily 
with reference to written modes.
 On the basis of this understanding, a series of narratives that seek to chart the contours of 
eighteenth-century attitudes towards these two communicative modes has been commonly 
accepted. The first posits that the work of enlightenment historians and antiquarians situates the 
relationship between oral and literate practices within a strongly progressivist account of the 
development of modern civilized society  from primitive and barbarous origins. A series of 
related oppositions structures this account, cementing a connection between the character of a 
given culture and its primary mode of communication: orality and literacy, savagery and 
politeness, passion and reason, ignorance and knowledge, superstition and skepticism. The 
second narrative adds the coda that for a significant number of eighteenth-century thinkers, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau being the prime example, this trajectory was not one of progress but of 
decline, entailing the loss of an ideal state of natural genius, unfettered humanity, and pure 
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1  The definitions of “oral” identified by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as current during the 
eighteenth century echo this attention to the physical activity of the mouth and confirm through quotations dating 
from 1767 and 1775 that “oral tradition” was understood as a characteristic of “ancient” and pre-literate cultures.
orality. The third, meanwhile, observes that the bias towards the present implicit within the 
narrative of progress also finds expression in eighteenth-century attitudes towards so-called 
“popular” culture. The conflation of genuinely ancient as well as comparatively late ballads and 
songs within the developing vogue for antiquarian salvage and publication encourages a mapping 
of the progression from orality  to literacy onto an opposition between what were held to be 
“popular” and “elite” cultures within contemporary Britain. This overlaying of attitudes is 
dependent on the fact that the key feature of “popular culture” was held to be its anachronistic 
reliance upon oral tradition and oral practices. The belief that with writing comes modernity, 
politeness, and rationality  meant that  the continued dominance of the oral within this sphere of 
eighteenth-century society was deemed not only primitive but also inferior, the mark of 
ignorance, superstition, and vulgarity. In turn, this feeds and is fed by concerns regarding social 
disorder, education, religious enthusiasm, and the divergent cultures of rural and urban life. 
 A typical example of this interpretation is offered by David Vincent who argues that  “in its 
forms and in its means of transmission popular culture was essentially illiterate and irrational, the 
mirror image of the culture of polite society, which now began to look with increasing 
fascination on the beliefs and modes of behaviour which it  assumed it had left 
behind” (1982:22). This metaphor of the “mirror image” encapsulates the model of direct 
opposition—between the primitive and civilized, the oral (illiterate) and literate, popular and 
elite—which, in fact, underpins each of these various but interconnected narratives. It also, 
however, represents precisely the kind of oversimplification that has been challenged by 
subsequent scholarship, and it is in this context that I intend here to re-examine it.
 Building on Peter Burke’s groundbreaking Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe 
(1978), Tim Harris (1995:18) has argued that while the “popular” label has been useful in 
stimulating new methodological approaches, it has also encouraged the development of a “series 
of dichotomies: between elite and popular; patrician and plebeian; high and low; rulers and ruled; 
learned and unlearned; literate and illiterate; godly and ungodly.” Under “critical examination,” 
however, he argues that “many  of these alleged dichotomies break down.” Thus “the once 
common view, that popular culture was essentially oral and that a fundamental cultural fissure 
developed in early modern England between the literate and illiterate classes, can no longer 
readily be held” (18). Barry  Reay (1998:55, 63) has made the same case: “Historians have not 
been sufficiently alert to the myriad ways in which orality suffused the world of print.” He has 
also questioned the validity of a “simple division between elite and popular” in relation to the 
literature of this period. In a similar vein the historian Adam Fox (2002:5) has developed a model 
of “feedback” between literacy  and orality  and elite and popular culture that extends throughout 
the early modern period and beyond. Here, he says, we find forms of society “in which the three 
media of speech, script, and print infused and interacted with each other in a myriad of ways . . . . 
There was no necessary antithesis between oral and literate forms of communication and 
preservation; the one did not have to destroy or undermine the other.” 
 Recent investigations of eighteenth-century balladry  have on the whole been sensitive to 
this complex picture and have responded positively to the work of scholars such as Dave Harker, 
whose Fakesong (1985) stimulated much debate about what he terms the “manufacture concept 
of British folksong” during this period and its consequences for our understanding of the 
relationship between so-called “popular” and “elite” cultures. Steve Newman (2007:9-12), for 
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example, has sought to “revise recent critiques of the rise of Literature in the eighteenth century, 
particularly as it bears on the relationship of elite to popular culture,” while the careful 
investigations of Dianne Dugaw (1989), Ruth Perry (2006, 2008), and Nick Groom (2006), into 
the composition, performance, and textual appropriation of individual ballads and songs has done 
much to illustrate the limitations of interpretative models that rely on simple polarities.
 Though reassessment of this kind has led to a new understanding of the cultural geography 
of the period, it has not been extended to include the evidence regarding eighteenth-century 
conceptions of these ideas of oral and literate, popular and elite. We have thus not thought as 
fully  as we might about how they  were viewed and represented at the time. In this respect, works 
such as those of Richard Dorson (1968), Stuart Piggott (1976), Rosemary  Sweet (2004), and 
Craig Ashley Hanson (2009), which examine the rise of antiquarianism within the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, are typical. They are immensely informative about the lives and work 
of the key antiquaries of the period, and their analysis of both the characteristic features of the 
antiquarian endeavor and of the immense variety of approaches adopted by different individuals 
has illuminated the complicated relationships between the antiquary and his evidence: between 
the standards of accuracy and proof to which he was committed and that were molded by the 
world of literacy and literature, and the often oral and “traditional” nature of the sources and 
“relics” that he sought to gather and investigate. They are not, however, always as attentive as 
they  might be to the historical contingency of the conceptual framework that is invoked by the 
language of such statements as this one by Sweet (2004:339): “the vulgar superstitions and 
credulity  that marked the popular customs and beliefs confirmed the superiority of the elite.” 
Furthermore, the sense of continuity set up by works such as those by Harker or Dorson, which 
trace the origins of modern folklore studies back to their roots in the eighteenth century, 
compounds such inattention by discouraging attempts to question the relevance of the nuanced 
critical vocabulary  in use today—particularly the terms “oral,” “orality,” “literate,” and 
“literacy”—to this earlier historical period. Taking two antiquarian texts that deliberately aim to 
represent and discuss eighteenth-century  “popular culture” and the oral practices and tradition 
contained within in it, I here aim to begin addressing these questions.
A Mirror Image? 
 The texts that  form the basis of this case study are Henry  Bourne’s Antiquitates Vulgares: 
Antiquities of the Common People (1725) and a revised and extended version of the same work, 
compiled by the cleric and antiquary John Brand, as Observations on Popular Antiquities (1777). 
Both works are independently significant; Sweet’s magisterial survey, Antiquaries (2004:335), 
argues that Bourne’s text is “generally  credited as being the starting point for subsequent studies 
of popular customs” and that Brand’s “may be seen as a significant landmark in the evolution of 
popular customs as a distinct area of enquiry.” But their particular relationship—two versions of 
one text, an original study that is critiqued, expanded, and altered after fifty years of change 
within the field of antiquarianism and in the nation more broadly—provides an additional and 
important dimension. Indeed, although Brand’s work is both more extensive and sophisticated 
than that of his predecessor, it remains in many ways indebted to Bourne’s initial vision. Brand 
 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ORALITY, LITERACY, AND POPULAR CULTURE 307
went on to be elected as Secretary to the Royal Society of Antiquaries each year from 1784 until 
his death in 1806, and his text, which he continued to work on throughout his life, was edited and 
published posthumously but very  successfully by Henry Ellis (Brand 1813). In this respect, his 
analysis in the Observations is representative of the discipline as it developed during the latter 
part of the century. And, although the same cannot accurately be said of Bourne with respect  to 
the start  of the period—his tone is too zealous, and his concern too much with the ills of the 
present and not with the artifacts of the past for this to be quite true—he does, nevertheless, 
express opinions that others shared, which were by no means unfounded or nonsensical.
  In terms of content, both texts describe and comment upon “a few of that vast Number of 
Ceremonies and Opinions, which are held by the Common People” (Bourne 1725:ix) with 
Brand’s additions comprising further examples and contextual material, as well as new 
interpretations designed to “correct” Bourne. To varying degrees, both authors seek to describe 
contemporary  “popular” practices and beliefs in relation to their historical origins, to discuss 
particular examples, to assess their threat to public order, and to pass judgment on their 
conformance with the principles of the Anglican Church. In this respect their texts can be located 
within a broader context of fascination with, but also hostility towards, traditional, rural, popular, 
and oral customs. Fears of enthusiasm and of the “mob” are widespread throughout the century, 
as are the residual Puritan antagonisms towards unmoderated personal behavior and vice.
 During the Interregnum of 1649-60, parliamentary  acts had banned the celebration of 
Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide (Pentecost), and a strict  emphasis on the sanctity of the 
Sunday Sabbath replaced the celebration of Saints days and traditional festivals. Along with the 
closure of inns and playhouses, any pastimes held to be a threat to religious, moral, and social 
order, including gambling, drinking, feasting, dancing, ballad-singing, and competitive or 
bloodthirsty sports such as cock-fighting, were actively repressed. Although those practices were 
later resumed, and in some cases even embraced with renewed vigor, the vestiges of such Puritan 
concerns remain and indeed are repropagated in the latter half of the century by the Evangelical 
and Methodist movements. In Bourne and Brand, this inheritance finds its expression in the 
substantial attention each devotes to the behavior encouraged by public gatherings, communal 
activities, and supposedly  licentious festivals, such as mumming, harvest celebrations, and the 
rituals of Christmas, Whitsun, Shrove Tuesday, and May Day.
 The two texts are not, however, identical in their aims. Where Bourne’s motivation for 
publication is primarily a desire for reform and regulation, Brand acts largely  out of antiquarian 
curiosity and pedantry. Bourne’s writing is an extension of his faith; he celebrates the triumph of 
English Protestantism over the evils of “popery” and heathenism, but laments the current state of 
the church: “alas! we are fallen into Times of such Irreligion and Prejudice,” of “Indolence” and 
“Ignorance” and “false” belief (5). His text is intended to improve and defend public morality, 
order, and true religion. It is dedicated to the Mayor, ten aldermen, Sheriff, and common council 
of the town, and is infused with a clear sense of shared responsibility and of the need for action. 
In Brand, writing from a position of increased Church stability, further from both the threat of 
Catholicism and the legacy of puritan hostility  toward it, we find little of this urgency. His 
antiquarian interests are instead allowed free rein, and are directed both toward the “antiquities” 
of the common people and the “relic” that is Bourne’s extant text. The image that appears on the 
frontispiece of both editions of the Observations—a picturesque scene of a ruined church now 
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populated with foliage and framed by a watching cherub—captures the nature of his detached 
gaze. He examines, therefore, not only numerous examples beyond those offered by  Bourne, but 
seeks also to repackage the original text in the light of new advances in antiquarian activity. “Mr 
Bourne” has not “done justice” to the subject, he writes: “New Lights have arisen since his Time. 
The English Antique has become a general and fashionable Study” (vi).
 Bearing this context in mind let us, as a preliminary, consider the ways in which Bourne 
and Brand might be said to follow the “mirror image” model described above. Vincent qualifies 
his use of this metaphor in a comment on Brand. He argues that  his work is grounded on “two 
basic assumptions”: that “the popular culture under investigation was fundamentally apart from 
and antecedent to that which the collectors belonged; and that its central element, the oral 
tradition, was in decline” (1982:23). But how far does the evidence support this claim? What 
about Bourne’s attitude? 
 It is certainly the case that both texts are organized around a separation of the cultural 
sphere of the authors from that which they describe. The education and social standing of each is 
established by their title pages: “Henry Bourne, M. A. Curate of the Parochial Chapel of All 
Saints in Newcastle upon Tyne” and “John Brand, A. B. Of Lincoln College, Oxford.” Both also 
emphasize their literacy and wide reading, setting up a contrast between the learned authors and 
the supposed illiteracy and poor education of the “common people” they document. This contrast 
echoes the distinction drawn by Bailey, Johnson, and Ash in their dictionary definitions of 
“literate” and the more usual eighteenth-century  form “literature,” which confirm that “learning” 
equates in this period only  to “skill in letters.” Bourne and Brand of course also produce printed 
works, collecting customs and beliefs maintained by oral tradition and submitting them to 
literary  and historical analysis. In so doing they  rely on textual evidence and literary authorities. 
Bourne looks to the venerable Bede for proof of his arguments, provides footnotes in Latin, and 
includes at least  one long quotation from Hamlet and many from Plutarch and the Bible. Brand, 
whose own personal library  was vast, boasts of the wide variety of historical and literary  texts he 
has consulted: “I have gleaned Passages that seemed to throw Light upon the Subject, from a 
great Variety of Volumes, and those written too in several Languages” (vi).2 
 The elision of the historical primitive and the contemporary  vulgar is also suggested by the 
language each author chooses for their title: “Antiquities of the Common People” and “Popular 
Antiquities.” Moreover, each deliberately frames his investigation of living beliefs, customs, and 
practices in antiquarian terms. They are represented as a set of historical artifacts, as objects fit to 
fill a cabinet of curiosities or a museum. Bourne describes May  Day, among other examples, as 
“the Relick of an ancient Custom” (201), and he aims to “wipe off therefore the Dust they 
[popular customs] have contracted, to clear them of Superstition, and make known their End and 
Design” (x). In this way the beliefs and practices that the texts describe are characterized as those 
of a rural, impolite, and ill-educated culture, whose vulgarity  represents their status as the 
anachronistic remains of an earlier age of barbarity. Bourne writes: “It is usual, in Country Places 
and Villages, where the Politeness of the Age hath made no great Conquest, to observe some 
particular Times with some Ceremonies that were customary  in the Days of our Fore-
Fathers” (115).
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2 The catalogue of Brand’s library lists more than 10,000 volumes (Brandiana 1807).
 Within the representation of these “common people,” literate prejudice against oral modes, 
educated prejudice against supposed ignorance, and social prejudice against a lower class are 
brought together. At the heart of this attitude is a discursive framework that operates far beyond 
these two texts and is characterized by a hostility towards customs and beliefs that are seen to be 
unverifiable, irrational, and perpetuated by superstition and incredulity. In their tracing of the 
roots of these customs and beliefs, both authors point out the logical inconsistencies within these 
practices, revealing the irrationality of their continued acceptance as a primary weakness of 
popular culture carried through oral tradition. For example, in the case of fairies, Bourne argues 
that their existence is just “an old fabulous Story that has been handed down even to our Days 
from the Times of Heathenism” (83). May Day, similarly, is “the relick of an ancient Custom 
among the Heathen” that is now upheld by the “British common people” (203-04). He also 
associates supernatural stories specifically with rural tale-telling: “nothing is commoner in 
Country Places, than for a whole Family  in a Winter’s Evening, to sit round the Fire, and tell 
Stories of Apparitions and Ghosts” (76). “Tales of haunted Houses” abound, he says: “Stories of 
this kind are infinite, and there are few villages which have not either had such a House in it, or 
near it” (41).
 This attitude towards “fabulous” stories manifests itself early in the century through John 
Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1721:205). He articulates in that work an 
anxiety about the potentially  damaging influence of old maids and nurses—conventionally 
understood not only as incorrigible gossips, but also as the central figures within the oral 
transmission of popular nursery rhymes, folk tales, and customary proverbs—over their socially 
superior charges. Locke warns that “the Examples of the Servants” are “the most dangerous of 
all” and advises that the young should be protected from their influence (idem):
always whilst he is young, be sure to preserve his tender mind from all impressions and notions of 
spirits and goblins, or any fearful apprehensions in the dark.  Thus he will be in danger from the 
indiscretion of servants, whose usual method is to awe children,  and keep them in subjection, by 
telling them of raw-head and bloody-bones, and such other names as carry with them the ideas of 
something terrible and hurtful, which they have reason to be afraid of when alone, especially in the 
dark. This must be carefully prevented. 
He also ascribes his own fear of the dark to the tales related to him by his nurse, and this 
anecdote is then repeated in The Spectator, when Joseph Addison discusses “legends and fables, 
antiquated romances, and the traditions of nurses and old women” (1715:vi, 127). Here he 
foregrounds their power to “bring up into our memory the stories we have heard in our 
childhood, and favour those secret terrors and apprehensions to which the mind of man is 
naturally  subject” (idem). Bourne directly references both Locke and Addison when he 
speculates upon the likelihood of lasting damage being caused by this kind of exposure to wild 
tales: “I am indeed very inclinable to believe, that these legendary Stories of Nurses and old 
Women, are the occasion of much greater Fears, than People without them, would generally have 
of these Things” (87). Brand appends a quotation from Horace (Ep. 2.2.208-09) to his title page 
that testifies to the same attitude: 
Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas 
Nocturnos lemures, portentaque.
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Thus for both authors “Dreams, magic terrors, spells of mighty power, / Witches, and ghosts who 
rove at midnight hour” are emblematic of the dangerous irrationality and heathen superstition at 
the heart of the popular culture they set out to examine. 
 As Vincent points out, however, there is another dimension to this fearful fascination with 
superstition and the oral tales that were believed to encourage and sustain it: “Throughout the 
eighteenth century, Catholicism remained synonymous with the popular culture of the common 
person, recalcitrantly immune to the edifying powers of print and depressingly prone to 
superstition and relic worship” (1982:42). A concatenation of this kind does manifest itself in 
both texts. The Catholic Church is, in Bourne’s opinion, as much to blame for superstitious 
beliefs as are any  heathen ancestors (84): “In the benighted Ages of Popery, when Hobgoblins 
and Sprights were in every City and Town and Village, by every Water and in every Wood . . . . 
But when that Cloud was dispell’d, and the Day sprung up, those spirits which wandered in the 
Night of Ignorance and Error, did really vanish at  the Dawn of Truth and the Light of 
Knowledge.” Although Brand is more cautious about tracing absolute origins, he nevertheless 
adopts a similar stance: the “popular Notions and vulgar Ceremonies in our Nation” found “their 
first Direction from the Times when Popery was an established Religion,” and were “sent over 
from Rome, with Bills, Indulgences, and other Baubles” (v). He casts superstitions explicitly as 
the “inventions of indolent Monks” who, out of boredom, devised “silly and wicked Opinions, to 
keep the World in Awe and Ignorance” (xi-xii). This connection to Catholicism reinforces the 
association of popular custom, oral practices, and oral tradition with a dark past, with incredulity, 
and with the absence of enlightenment reason, but does so through a specifically  theological 
interpretation of “oral tradition.” The term is first  used by Bishop Joseph Hall (1628:167) in a 
defense of the Anglican Church against Catholicism; where the Protestant position is one of Sola 
Scriptura, the Catholic doctrine of apostolic succession ensures that oral pronouncements from 
within the church are directly  tied to the word of God, and thus are of equal or even superior 
authority to the written word. By the invocation of this doctrine, therefore, various forms of 
incredulity and irrationality are brought into alignment: the failure of the Catholic church to 
interrogate its heathen influences and to understand the potential for corruption and fallibility 
within the mechanism of oral tradition; the naiveté of faithful believers who accept this oral 
authority and follow the wider practices of the Catholic Church, all of which are characterized as 
superstitious; and finally, the foolishness of those “common people” who, although not Catholic, 
nevertheless maintain and perpetuate a set of customs and beliefs that are oral, antiquated, 
irrational, and counter to the prevailing culture of Protestantism and print.
 There is, therefore, some evidence to support the conclusion that in eighteenth-century 
thought popular culture and its associated oral dimension were directly  opposed to, or a mirror 
image of, an elite culture held to be urban, polite, educated, rational, and literate. Equally, the 
suggestion made by  Vincent that this popular culture and the oral tradition at its heart were 
viewed as the relics of a world that had been “left behind” (1982:22) receives some 
corroboration. As I have suggested, however, these interpretations are by no means beyond 
challenge.
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Beyond Opposition and Reflection?
 The first indication of a weakness within these two conclusions arises from their resistance 
to reconciliation. The spatial equivalence and temporal simultaneity  suggested by the metaphor 
of reflection does not sit comfortably with the linearity  and succession implicit in the model of 
historical progression; they suggest different conceptions both of the individual status of each 
sphere and of the relationship between them. Furthermore, a consideration of the structure of this 
mirror image metaphor reveals that although it illustrates more than one relation, none receives 
corroboration in the texts under examination.
 One way to think about a mirror image would be to argue that it describes a relationship of 
exact symmetry  but direct  inversion: two cultures that are equal in size and shape but that are 
comprised of opposite materials. This clearly  is not the picture that emerges from these texts. It  is 
true that Brand’s approach is subtler than that of Bourne, but neither is free from an essential 
bias. The culture of the “common people” is not considered in terms equal to that of the elite. 
Their customs and beliefs are associated with ignorance, superstition, and the primitive, and their 
orality is commonly depicted as simply the absence of literacy. Of course it is this negative 
definition that generates the concept of Antiquitates Vulgares in the first  place, but the 
representation of popular beliefs and practices as the relics of an earlier stage in the development 
of polite society unavoidably  pushes the reflection (popular culture) out of alignment with the 
object before the mirror (elite culture). It is not merely that the mirror is small and the reflection 
is diminutive, but that  the reflection is held to have preceded politeness and print both in time 
and in the progressive stages of man’s development. Thus the sense that popular culture is 
anachronistic, the remnant of an “antecedent” stage out of which modern culture grew, makes it 
impossible to understand the relation between them as one of direct opposition.
 What about reflection? Should the mirror image metaphor instead be understood in terms 
of a tangible object exerting a genuine presence in front of the mirror and at the same time 
creating a weaker reflection or illusion, of no real substance or independent existence? Perhaps. 
The arrangement of Bourne and, to a greater extent, Brand’s texts around the activities of salvage 
and judgment situates popular culture in the past, or as merely a surviving relic from a lost age, 
and thereby denies it contemporary self-governance. Similarly, the creation of a textual 
collection asserts the inadequacy of oral tradition as a means to transmit  and preserve its customs 
and beliefs. In this way, one might say that both this popular culture and its central oral mode are 
tied to the so-called elite culture from whose perspective both men are writing, and indeed that 
the reflection is the weaker of the two.
 But on the other hand, the evidence also suggests that Bourne and Brand do recognize the 
power held by the “common people” and thus that they  attend to something that a mirror image 
model renders impossible: that the reflection can demonstrably  influence the society  in front of 
the mirror. We have seen how Bourne’s text responds emphatically  to the perceived threat posed 
by the vulgar and their customary beliefs and practices, and although it is true that this is 
ameliorated somewhat by Brand’s edition, it  is a concern of which he remains conscious. Both 
texts associate threats to public order with the gathering of large groups during popular festivals 
such as May Day and harvest, and this anxiety  is then fanned by their belief in the supposed 
irrationality  and immoderation of the “common people.” This attitude is best exemplified in the 
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accounts each offers of the ancient practice of mumming. Bourne describes it as the “changing of 
Clothes between Men and Women,” followed by a procession “from one Neighbour’s House to 
another,” and accompanied by  “dancing and singing.” He traces it back to an ancient Saturnalia 
festival, and wishes that it be “laid aside, as it  is the Occasion of much Uncleanness and 
Debauchery” (142-47). Brand, meanwhile, although less concerned about sinfulness, 
nevertheless appends a long description of a mumming ceremony in 1377 involving one hundred 
and thirty citizens, and another in which Henry IV himself participated (196-98). In both the 
anarchic overtones are clear. The exchanging of clothes between the sexes is a conventional 
symbol of boundary transgression, as is the invocation of the Roman festival of Saturnalia, and 
in their scale, spontaneity, and composition (even the king himself parades through the streets in 
costume) these instances of mumming exert a demonstrable threat not  only to public order but to 
the authority that upholds it.
 From this perspective the process of inscription undertaken by our two authors appears 
defensive, as the extension of a literate “public” authority over a culture that threatens the 
prevailing order. Daniel Woolf (1988:37) identifies oral tradition as a form of “masterless 
history” and texts such as Bourne’s and Brand’s can be seen as attempts to gain mastery over this 
history, to anatomize and to explain it until, laid bare, it becomes innocuous. Thus the collection 
and judgment of oral practices, and oral tradition itself, within the confines of a printed text can 
be seen as the removal of the element of live spectacle, and hence of the possibility  of 
threatening disorder. Once inscribed, the tradition is decontextualized and stripped of the 
authority that arises from performance and transmission, where the audience or participants do 
not simply peruse a book, but where their listening and activity  embodies and perpetuates the 
tradition that facilitates their entertainment. 
 Maintaining the mirror image metaphor in the face of these considerations is thus not 
viable. Neither opposition nor reflection adequately captures what is at  work in these texts. 
Where Bourne’s attitude, however, can primarily be characterized by its foregrounding of the 
threat posed to his Anglican faith, Brand’s revisions are more than antiquarian in their 
motivation. By  attending to this difference, to the additional complexity of Brand’s attitude 
towards the culture of the “common people,” it  becomes possible to see the implications of this 
reassessment, both for our understanding of the eighteenth century  and of our own research 
practice.
The Popular, the People, the Public?
 The distinctive feature of Brand’s work is its engagement with contemporary politics. He 
proclaims in his preface that (vii, ix):
Pride, which, independent of the Idea arising from the Necessity of civil Polity, has portioned out 
the human Genus into such a variety of different and subordinate Species, must be compelled to 
own, that the lowest of these derives itself from an Origin, common to it with the highest of the 
Kind . . . .  Nothing can be foreign to our Enquiry, which concerns the smallest of the Vulgar; of 
those little ones, who occupy the lowest Place in the political Arrangement of human Beings.
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This attention to the “Vulgar” and their “Place” within the political organization of eighteenth-
century society not only augments the sense of a cultural hierarchy  that has already been 
observed, but extends the list of characteristics that  the “common people” were depicted as not 
possessing to include property and suffrage. In the context of a pressing contemporary debate 
about the decline in public spirit  and national pride, it also signals Brand’s engagement with the 
question of who or what constitutes this “public” and this “nation.” By the time of his revised 
edition many were arguing that political change was necessary to tackle corruption and restore 
virtue, and the idea that the public spirit had weakened, leaving the nation under threat  from 
foreign attack and its liberty in peril, was a central Country  tenet. In addition to an increasing 
fear of the French, there was moreover a general consciousness of the damage that had been 
done by the progress of the Pretender’s army, and of a national failure to demonstrate a sufficient 
spirit of pride and resistance.
 Luxury, as a form of idleness, selfishness, and effeminacy, was cited as a primary  reason 
for this weakness. It was associated with a corrupt government and an excessive concern for 
refinement and the pursuit of wealth among the higher classes. But at the same time another 
manifestation of luxury  was believed to lead to the crimes of the common people, the fear of 
whose criminality and disorder was prevalent among polite society. J. A. W. Gunn (1983:96-130) 
defines this alternative form—“the luxury  of the poor”—as “any consumption or activity of this 
class not connected to their work.” Bob Harris (2002:288) describes the situation as one in which 
it “was widely believed that the roots of criminal behaviour and activity were idleness or an 
inappropriate addiction to pleasure amongst the lower orders.” This is certainly the opinion of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Felonies, to whose evidence Harris turns. Appointed in February  of 
1751, it  considers the cause of crime to be the “habit of idleness, in which the lower People have 
been but bred from their Youth” (idem).
 A key contribution was made to the luxury debate by the cleric, author, and moralist John 
Brown’s An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of our Time (1757:93). Here, in the 
aftermath of the loss of Menorca to the French at  the start of the Seven Years War, he asserts that 
it is because of an obsession with the refinement of manners, that the “Character of our boasted 
national Bravery” is threatened. The “spirit of Liberty,” he argues, is “struggling against the 
Manners and Principles,” as it once did against tyrants. It has become common, he claims, for a 
gentleman to pay to defend his country  against the French but to refuse to fight: “it cannot be 
amiss to observe, that a little of the active Spirit of Courage would do well, in order to give Play 
to this boasted Engine, which otherwise may sink into a dead and unactive Mass” (18). In his 
view—one that brought him commercial success but little political advancement—this weakness 
of the public spirit  is the responsibility  of the elite because the vulgar are unthinking and 
incapable of self-determination or action (25):
[The] Manners and Principles of those who lead,  not of those who are led; of those who govern, 
not of those who are governed; of those, in short, who make Laws or execute them, will ever 
determine the Strength or Weakness, and therefore the Continuance or Dissolution of a State . . . 
for the blind Force or Weight of an ungoverned Multitude can have no steady nor rational Effect, 
unless some leading Mind rouse it into Action, and point it to it’s proper End; without this, it is 
either a brute and random Bolt, or a lifeless Ball sleeping in the Cannon: It depends on some 
superior Intelligence, to give it both Impulse and Direction.
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This attitude proves a useful counterpoint to that of our antiquarian author. Whereas Brown 
dismisses the common people as merely “lifeless” and “brute,” a “blind Force or Weight” to be 
directed, and does not cite their behavior as a source of luxury, Brand includes them in his 
estimation of the public spirit and national pride (v-vi):
The Common People, confined by daily Labour, seem to require their proper Intervals of 
Relaxation; perhaps it is of the highest political Utility to encourage innocent Sports and Games 
among them. The Revival of many of these, would, I think, be highly pertinent at this particular 
Season, when the general Spread of Luxury and Dissipation threaten more than at any preceding 
Period to extinguish the Character of our boasted national Bravery.
He claims that it would be politically astute to encourage, rather than condemn, periods of 
“Relaxation” involving “Sports and Games” for the “Common People.” In contrast to the 
deleterious effects of “Luxury and Dissipation,” it is implied that these interludes of active but 
simple diversion would bolster “national Bravery.”3
 This proposal, unlike Brown’s, seems to afford the “Common People” a degree of 
humanity, influence, and responsibility, and it does not assume that their lack of property and 
hence “interest” (62) precludes their contribution to the state of the nation. But while he 
understands their value to reside in more than mere unthinking force, the scheme is deliberately 
limited. Its utility, Brand claims, is strictly “political” (62) and the diversions he suggests would 
be carefully  controlled. He does not intend that all popular entertainments should be revived for 
this purpose, and the “innocent Sports and Games” he does put forward are isolated and 
disconnected from tradition and history. His role as the author of the Observations affords him 
critical distance, and as a potential savior or abolisher of long-held customs and beliefs this 
position is one of power. He surveys the scene of popular culture, picking those practices that 
seem harmless and potentially useful in rectifying the slippage towards the artifice and 
effeminacy of luxury, and discarding the rest.
 An attitude of this kind, which favors “certain genres and contents over others” and 
deeming some beliefs or activities to be “authentic, genuine, trustworthy, or legitimate” while 
necessarily rejecting others, has been described by Susan Stewart (1991:105) and Regina Bendix 
(1997:48) as the “artifactualization of expressive culture.” Brand’s proposal certainly  engages 
with this process, but it also shares an affinity with the work of other antiquaries such as Thomas 
Percy’s Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765), or later William Motherwell’s Minstrelsy 
Ancient and Modern (1827), which encouraged a revival of interest in traditional ballads and 
songs, yet did so through a careful process of collection, correction, and textualization—what 
Alfred B. Friedman (1961:9) describes as “the translation of the genre from an active life on the 
popular level to a ‘museum life’ on the sophisticated level.” It  is within this context  that James 
Macpherson’s Ossian poems were able to generate such controversy  and interest. As the title of 
his first  publication—Fragments of Ancient Poetry collected in the highlands of Scotland and 
translated from the Gallic or Erse Language (1760)—suggests, Macpherson tapped into an 
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3  Brand is not unique in this respect. Popular entertainments and holidays were promoted during the 
seventeenth century, and fears of their insurrectionary potential allayed, through the publication of James VI’s 
Basilikon Doron (1599) and its later extension and reissue under Charles I as the Book of Sports (1618). A similar 
suggestion is also made contemporaneously by Adam Smith (1776:ii, 384-85).
existing fascination with the oral culture of ancient peoples. What he also traded on, however, 
was the expectation encouraged by  scrupulously  edited, “amended,” and “purified” publications 
such as Percy’s Reliques, namely that ancient songs were not barbarous or rude in the way that 
might have been expected, but rather were compatible with eighteenth-century taste. The crucial 
factor in his success, as Fiona Stafford (1994) and Adam Potkay (1992) have so convincingly 
shown, was the way in which Macpherson managed to both separate Ossian from the present day 
on account of his antiquity, pure orality, and emotional intensity, and also to connect him to it, 
not only  by the production of a supposedly “genuine” and “original” manuscript that satisfied the 
antiquarian criterion of verifiable evidence, but  also through the poetic description of an invented 
culture that was miraculously both primitive and entirely  in tune with eighteenth-century ideas of 
sensibility, honorable virtue, and refined manners.4
 The practical viability  of the plan to revive selected “sports and games” is borne out, to a 
degree, by the deliberate reinstatement after 1660 of the traditional customs and festivities 
banned by the Puritans, such as the singing of Christmas carols and maypole dancing, and indeed 
also by the vogue for traditional songs, dancing, and in Scotland bagpipes, which followed the 
publication of songbooks and collections such as Allan Ramsay’s Tea-Table Miscellany 
(1724-47).5  Brand suggests, however, an even more deliberate process of limited, artificial 
revival. The “Sports and Games” he recommends would be imposed from above, rather than 
developing from within the group, and would be carefully  policed. His concern is not with 
aesthetic standards or with ideas of national identity, but rather with balancing the potential 
usefulness of a contented people against the potential for disorder inherent in communal 
activities and gatherings. In this respect  Brand’s view of the role of “sports and games” differs in 
a significant respect from the festival forms examined by Mikhail Bakhtin (1968:255), who 
describes a situation in which the value and utility  of the festival mode is derived from its 
location “outside of and contrary to all existing forms of coercive socioeconomic and political 
activity, which is suspended for the time of the festivity.” Brand, by contrast, deliberately seeks 
to limit the festive element of his “Sports and Games” to only  one cultural sub-group, and he 
intends rather to strengthen prevailing social norms—in particular the “boasted National 
Character”—than to facilitate even their temporary suspension.
 E. P. Thompson (1991:50) has argued that during the course of the eighteenth century  “the 
Church lost command over the “leisure” of the poor, their feasts and festivals,” and in this 
context these proposals would seem to be attempts to regain for the “Public Authority” of the 
“State” what had previously  been under the control of the Church. In Brand’s work an authority 
and power of this kind is attributed first to the Catholic Church but also to the influence of its 
superstitious legacy. The “Holy Church” is described as “fabricating” and “imposing” on “her 
servile Devotees” a “Yoke,” and the childish rites, pageants, and ceremonies of the “Romish 
Calendars” are thus “Shackles” (vi-vii). Those who continue to believe in such superstitions are 
similarly  captive. Brand remarks, for example, in reference to an essay on popular customs by 
Addison in The Spectator, that “No Bondage seems so dreadful as that  of Superstition: It hath 
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4 For further details of the Ossian debate, see Gaskill and Stafford 1998 and Moore 2003.
5 The first Tea-Table Miscellany comprised 185 pages and was published in 1724, but by 1794 it had been 
expanded to 430 pages and had reached its nineteenth edition.
ever imposed the most abject kind of Slavery” (96).6
 However, as John Mullan and Christopher Reid (2000:13) have pointed out, the 
relationship between the state, the Anglican Church, its clergy, and the “common” parishioners is 
in fact more complex. On the one hand, clergymen stood for a church that places its faith in the 
biblical text, and as respected members of a community and official representatives of a 
confessional state they possess “Public Authority.” Yet  on the other hand, and this was 
particularly true in smaller or more rural communities, “they  were also viewed as the custodians 
of local memory  and traditions which still centered on the parish church, a role expressed in their 
participation in calendar customs and communal festivities” (idem). This ambiguous role is 
significant in itself, testifying as it does to the way  in which these individuals bridge the 
supposed divide between oral and literate as well as between popular and elite cultures. 
However, it also echoes the wider problem of definition brought into focus by  the different 
attitudes of Brown and Brand: if it is difficult to fully  separate these clerical figures from the 
popular culture of their parishioners, so too is it problematic to identify the point at which their 
supposed “Public Authority” intersects with the idea of the “people.” 
 Kathleen Wilson (1995:19) describes both what was at stake in these labels (“popular,” 
“people,” “public”) and the way  that they were manipulated between 1715 and 1785: “Since it 
was the (largely mythical) role of the people in the constitution that in [the minds of] most 
contemporaries” distinguished English liberty  from Continental absolutism, populist beliefs and 
discourses were a crucial plank in the construction of national identities and consciousness. But 
“the people,” as a phrase, was also used to “delimit the political nation . . . consisting of those 
deemed respectable or well-affected enough to be included in its boundaries” and excluding 
others. The “common people” who form the subject of Bourne and Brand’s studies would seem 
at first glance to represent precisely one of these excluded groups. Brand’s proposal to foster 
“public spirit” through the cultivation of their “innocent Sports and Games,” however, seems to 
suggest the opposite. Neither conclusion, I argue, is entirely  accurate. Johnson’s Dictionary 
(1755) captures the inherent ambiguity in the word “people,” revealing a tension in the first of its 
multiple definitions—“A nation; those who compose a community”—which is then compounded 
by further contradictions: “the vulgar,” “persons of a particular class,” “men, or persons in 
general.”7  In fact, therefore, it is Brand’s equivocation over these “people” as members of the 
“public” and the “political nation” that should hold our attention.
 His attitude towards the “intervals of Relaxation” required by the “common people” is 
inflected by a concern also present in Bourne regarding idleness. But where a legacy of 
Puritanism is clearly apparent in Bourne’s concern for the space this idleness might open up for 
sin and immorality, Brand’s more utilitarian perspective suggests an additional interest in 
efficiency. In respect of this, E. P. Thompson’s argument (1991:51) that “in rural society  where 
small farming and the cottage economy persisted . . . the organization of work was so varied and 
irregular” makes it false to draw a sharp distinction between “work” and “leisure,” and needs to 
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6 He is referring to The Spectator, No. 7, 8th March 1711 (Addison 1715:i, 40.)
7 A range of meanings is also suggested by the OED, including “the general public” and “the people,” but 
the sense of the popular as plebeian or of low birth, which is clearly indicated by Johnson’s reference to “the 
vulgar,” is represented as not in use after 1691, a conclusion I would dispute.
be balanced against that  of Robert Malcolmson (1973:89-90): “genteel attitudes towards many 
aspects of popular culture had become increasingly  unsympathetic since at least the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century.” The reason for this change of opinion was a “concern for effective 
labour discipline” and a consequent aversion to practices seen as wasteful and self-indulgent.
 Beyond Bourne’s and Brand’s observations that popular beliefs and customs fill the rare 
moments when the common people are not working with foolish practices based on erroneous 
superstition, practices that are hence literally  a waste of time and effort, the idea of labor in the 
debates surrounding luxury and the public spirit characterizes popular culture and oral tradition 
as inefficient and wasteful. Customary practices serve no rational function and dissipate vital 
energy, while the transmission of accumulated knowledge, history, stories, or practices, orally 
from person to person and down the generations, is understood to be flawed because it cannot 
meet literate standards of control and stability, because it is fluid, involves inevitable loss, and 
depends on the activity of fallible individuals. Much of the degradation that Brand and other 
antiquarians report is held to be the consequence of mishearing as well as misunderstanding, and 
the connection that Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopaedia (1728:ii, 856) draws between popular 
customs and error, and even corruption, was common: “Popular errors” are “such as people who 
imbibe from one another, by custom, education, and tradition.”
 Within this context, the “intervals of Relaxation” described by  Brand take on an uncertain 
status. He offers contradictory opinions about the weakness and/or strength of oral tradition. His 
preface begins with the statement that: “Tradition has in no Instance so clearly  evinced her 
Faithfulness, as in the transmitting of vulgar Rites and popular Opinions.” Yet  he compares its 
customs to remnants of statuary, “mutilated . . . Things, composed of such flimsy Materials as the 
Fancies of a Multitude, [which] do not seem calculated for a long Duration” (iii). And even here, 
in his second statement, these “Fancies,” depicted as inconsequential, merely the froth of vulgar 
superstition, are judged in material terms (as remnants of statuary) that are more in accordance 
with the supposed solidity  and durability of written records than the vagaries of oral tradition, 
carried on the breath of the common people. One explanation for this inconsistency would 
simply  be to say that it  is an example of an elitist literate authority exerting itself over an inferior 
cultural sphere. When we observe, though, that the same pattern emerges with regard to his 
proposal to revive “innocent Sports and Games” for the benefit of “national Bravery,” it is clear 
that there is more at stake.
 Brand’s distinction between “daily Labour” and “Relaxation” separates the common people 
from the landed classes, for whom life would not have been punctuated by this cycle, and 
indicates a degree of respect for their genuine toil and an acknowledgment of its necessity  and 
value for the nation. The characterization of their “Relaxation” (especially when it  is self-
directed and of organic development) as inefficient and idle subjects leisure to the criteria of 
labor. The application of these standards of efficiency and productivity to labor and relaxation, 
more commonly  understood in this period as either the absence or the cessation of work, brings 
into alignment the “common people” who do labor and the elite who conspicuously  do not under 
a common expectation. Thus Brown criticizes those who govern for their laziness, effeminacy, 
and luxury, and essays a version of the same complaint against the common people. In this way 
concerns regarding efficiency  and wastefulness, as well as labor and leisure, are brought to bear 
upon one another in such a way as to cut across the division between popular and elite. If the 
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labor and leisure of the common people are governed by the same standards as those for the elite, 
and have the potential to influence the “spirit” and “pride” of the nation as a whole, it becomes 
possible to reconcile the contradiction in the term “people” and incorporate the “vulgar” within 
the realm of the “public.”
A New Perspective
 Rather than opposition and reflection, Brand’s attitude is built  on an awareness of the 
interpenetration of these cultures, and of a relationship between them that is predicated on more 
than a narrative of historical progress or of social hierarchy. The potential reciprocity he 
imagines, and his gestures towards a democratic notion of “the people,” are substantial 
departures from the work of his predecessor and from the narratives with which we began. But 
although it is now clear that the mirror image metaphor fails to capture the complex 
representation that these so-called “oral,” “literate,” “popular,” and “elite” cultures receive within 
the works of Bourne and Brand, the evidence in fact points to more than a weakness of 
figuration. The tensions and ambiguities that pervade Brand’s attempts to consider the place of 
the vulgar and their oral popular culture within the body politic do indicate an uncertainty within 
his position; however, they also reveal the bluntness of such labels as critical tools. It is 
significant that he does not dismiss the “common people” out of hand and that he is able to move 
beyond an antiquarian perspective in his critique of their beliefs and customs; it is perhaps more 
significant, though, that he does so in an entirely localized context.
 A network of associations, habitual connections, and prejudices surrounding the social 
hierarchy, oral tradition, superstition, education, and historical progress structures the texts that 
we have examined. They are embedded within changing discourses of religion and nationhood, 
and reflect shifts in attitude towards the land brought about by  continued enclosures, 
urbanization, and rural depopulation.8  As a consequence, it is problematic to disentangle 
individual strands from the wider complex or to transplant the attitudes and ideas embedded 
within this context to another. Brand’s attention is not directed towards “orality,” “literacy,” or 
“popularity” in general or in the abstract, but  rather towards the customs and beliefs of a 
particular group within England at a precise moment in history. While it  is entirely possible from 
the perspective of twenty-first century  scholarship to conceive, for example, of an oral thread 
linking various eighteenth-century practices—polite conversation and bardic song, or the 
emotive preaching of Wesley and the ideals of secular oratory drawn from Aristotle and Cicero—
this is precisely what does not occur to men like Bourne and Brand. “Orality” is not  even a term 
that dictionaries from this period include, and “literate,” as John Ash (1775) notes, is “not much 
used.”
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8 Roger D. Abrahams’ (1993) analysis of the influence of such changes in land use upon the symbolic role 
of the peasantry,  who, he argues, come to be nostalgically reimagined as “the folk,” is particularly instructive. The 
connections he draws between eighteenth-century England and the slave cultures of the American South 
(1992:54-82) provide further evidence of the significance of attitudes engendered by changes of this kind within the 
broader context of folklore studies.
 Thus this case study  demonstrates that narratives that seek to chart eighteenth-century 
attitudes towards abstract concepts such as the oral and the literate, or the popular and the public, 
are both limited and limiting. To propose their banishment is clearly impractical, and indeed it is 
likely that writing and thinking without any recourse to them would prove equally unhelpful. But 
the example of Bourne and Brand nevertheless illustrates the need for a new attentiveness to the 
heritage of our critical vocabulary and a willingness to interrogate its assumptions. Attempting to 
examine the way in which the relationship between orality, literacy, and popular culture was 
understood and represented in the eighteenth century is to impose on the source material terms 
that are inappropriate and expectations that are unsuitable. To continue to do so, then, when the 
alternative could prove more productive, is to run the risk of encouraging connections where 
there may have been none and of missing valuable material by looking in the wrong place. 
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